Position discrepancy
With both position inputs valid, if the absolute left/right position difference exceeds 5 degrees continuously for 200 ms, the controller shall set MOTOR_ENABLE to FALSE within 50 ms after that 200 ms interval ends.
A practical AI assurance example
Follow a requirements review from a plausible AI draft to a traceable engineering decision.
The useful question is not whether the output looks convincing. It is whether the review can find an omitted requirement, incomplete test coverage or a result that does not apply to the current design.
Original illustrative example. The requirements, test extracts and simulated AI draft below are invented for this guide. Numerical values are not recommended design values. This is not a client case, model benchmark, qualified-tool demonstration or approval.
The agreed use of the tool
The AI assists the engineering process. It is not installed in the aircraft.
Propose candidate links between a fixed source packet of requirements and tests. Identify supporting source locations and possible gaps.
A defined engineering review checks the complete requirement inventory and every disposition before the traceability record is released. The AI cannot mark a requirement verified.
One source packet. Three views.
A hypothetical flap-monitor controller. Current baseline: FM-REQ Rev B and FM-CFG Rev B. A real review would use the complete applicable specifications and evidence.
With both position inputs valid, if the absolute left/right position difference exceeds 5 degrees continuously for 200 ms, the controller shall set MOTOR_ENABLE to FALSE within 50 ms after that 200 ms interval ends.
If either position input remains invalid continuously for 100 ms, the controller shall set MOTOR_ENABLE to FALSE within 50 ms after that 100 ms interval ends.
After MOTOR_ENABLE has been set to FALSE by FM-101 or FM-102, the controller shall retain that inhibit when the initiating condition clears, until a maintenance reset is accepted.
The controller shall reject a maintenance-reset request while the aircraft ground-state input indicates airborne, and shall retain the inhibit.
Set both positions valid. Introduce a 6-degree difference for 500 ms. At 500 ms, check that MOTOR_ENABLE is FALSE.
No execution result or output-transition timestamp is supplied.
Set the left position input invalid for 200 ms. Check MOTOR_ENABLE at the end of that interval. Recorded outcome: FALSE.
No right-input case or timing trace is supplied. The report identifies the earlier configuration.
With the ground-state input indicating on ground, create a position discrepancy, confirm inhibit, clear the discrepancy and issue a maintenance reset. Check that the inhibit clears.
No observation between fault clearance and reset, no airborne-reset case and no execution result are supplied.
There are four input requirements. A review of only the rows returned by the AI could miss an entire obligation.
Simulated output / Deliberately flawed
FM-101 → TC-11Fully covered. The discrepancy test confirms the required shutdown.
FM-102 → TC-12Fully covered and passed. The invalid-input test confirms the response.
FM-103 → TC-13Fully covered. The maintenance-reset test verifies inhibit retention and recovery.
All requirements are covered. No additional test actions identified.
This text was constructed for the example. It is not an actual model evaluation.
Reviewed disposition / Verification remains open
Candidate link: TC-11 exercises one sustained discrepancy. Accept it as a relevant starting point.
Gap: An observation at 500 ms cannot establish the required output-transition time. The extract also does not establish persistence behaviour or the relevant threshold boundaries. A procedure is not a passed test.
Action: Define clause-specific cases, timing measurements and applicable tolerances. Review the executed results for the agreed configuration.
Owner: verification engineer, with requirements-owner clarification where needed.
Candidate link: TC-12 provides an earlier result for one invalid left input.
Gap: It does not establish the right-input behaviour or the required timing. FM-CFG Rev A is different from the current Rev B baseline.
Action: Review change impact and justify any reuse. Identify and perform the additional verification needed for both input paths and timing. An earlier pass is neither automatically invalid nor automatically applicable.
Owners: verification engineer and configuration/change owner.
Candidate link: TC-13 addresses part of the ground-reset behaviour.
Gap: Checking recovery after reset does not establish that the inhibit stayed latched between fault clearance and reset.
Action: Observe continued inhibit after the initiating condition clears and before a reset is requested. Cover both initiating paths where required by the complete specification.
Owner: verification engineer.
Candidate link: None. The requirement was omitted from the draft.
Gap: The supplied packet contains no airborne-reset case.
Action: Add a case checking reset rejection and retained inhibit. Review the ground-state interface assumptions and relevant transitions against the full specification.
Owners: requirements/traceability reviewer and verification engineer.
A corrected traceability disposition and an evidence plan. None of the four requirements is marked verified from these extracts. The next work is to resolve the gaps and review the resulting evidence.
Make the checking process specific
Evidence for the engineering process
Task, users, allowed output, reliance limits and the defined checking process.
Document revisions, source locations, requirement count and unreadable or omitted material.
Available model identifier, date, prompt revision, settings, supplied sources and raw output.
Clause coverage, exact evidence locations, accepted and rejected links, rationale, reviewer and date.
Gaps, owners, resolution records and restrictions on releasing or relying on the output.
Reassessment after changes to the sources, model, prompts, extraction, retrieval or review method.
Download an editable text worksheet containing the example dispositions and a blank review record.
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